NOTES

1. There is also work to be done on Aristotle's conception of quick-wittedness in connection with Peirce's account of *apogogue* (81). *Posterior Analytics* I.34, 89b10: "Quick wit is a faculty of hitting upon the middle term instantaneously."

2. See CP 6.481, where "Berkeley, Kant, and others" are placed at the origins of pragmaticism; also, CP 6.482: "In 1871, in a Metaphysical Club in Cambridge, Massachusetts, I used to preach this principle as a sort of logical gospel, representing the unformulated method followed by Berkeley, and in conversation about it I called it 'Pragmatism.'"

3. Compare CP 7.620, where Peirce's states that "image," understood as a representation, is a misnomer when applied to percepts.

4.

> CP 2.435: A judgment is an act of consciousness in which we recognize a belief, and a belief is an intelligent habit upon which we shall act when occasion presents itself. Of what nature is that recognition? It may come very near action. The muscles may twitch and we may restrain ourselves only by considering that the proper occasion has not arisen. But in general, we virtually resolve upon a certain occasion to act as if certain imagined circumstances were perceived. This act which amounts to such a resolve, is a peculiar act of the will whereby we cause an image, or icon, to be associated, in a peculiarly strenuous way, with an object represented to us by an index. This act itself is represented in the proposition by a symbol, and the consciousness of it fulfills the function of a symbol in the judgment.

> CP 5.538: This act of stamping with approval, "endorsing" as one's own, an imaginary line of conduct so that it shall give a general shape to our actual future conduct is what we call a resolve. It is not at all essential to the practical belief, but only a somewhat frequent attachment.

5. The closest Kaag gets: "The solution to this problematic situation is not readily at hand or, more accurately, is not recognized as being readily at hand" (107).

6.

> CP 7.726: In the process of inference, or the self-controlled formation of new belief on the basis of Knowledge already possessed, I remark three chief steps. They are, first, the putting together of facts which it had not occurred to us to consider in their bearings upon one another, second, experimentation, observation, and experimental analysis, *which is substantially the same process whether it be performed with physical apparatus such as the chemist uses or with an apparatus of diagrams of our own creation, such as the mathematician employs*, and third, the generalization of experimental results, that is, the recognition of the general conditions governing the experiment, and the formation of a habit of thought under the influence of it. (emphasis added)

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Democracy and Leadership: On Pragmatism and Virtue

Eric Thomas Weber. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015.

According to Eric Weber, people want good leadership; *Democracy and Leadership* gives the people what they want. Weber uses Plato and John Dewey, along with references to contemporary philosophers such as Cornel West and Paul Kurtz, to elaborate upon a specific idea of leadership. Workshopping ideas, Weber crafts from various sources what can be called a Mission Statement for the book: Leadership will be "*the application of wisdom and justice with courage and moderation to the guidance of human conduct*" (18).

Effective leadership should communicate in ways that are both accessible and pithy, while avoiding the dreaded boss-speak lampooned, for example, in the famous *Office Space* movie. Weber is direct and interesting, and he delegates any detailed philosophical discussions to elaborate chapter endnotes. While introducing new examples, Weber continually repeats his well-honed definition of leadership. In its most refined version, *Democracy and Leadership*'s thesis is almost so succinct that it becomes more like sloganeering than philosophy. Condensing the ancient philosophical virtues of wisdom, justice, courage, and moderation into a banner—"good leadership is *judicious yet courageous guidance*" (18)—the book extends to 256 pages while remaining relevant. The chapter devoted more specifically to Mississippi politics seems at first like it might be skippable, but it is worthwhile. Weber demonstrates critical and creative thinking skills when detailing solutions to public problems such as the controversial presence of sex education and corporal punishment in public schools, and the challenge of respecting free speech while confronting the prospects of a KKK rally at the University of Mississippi. The responses to the problems do not seem especially philosophically novel, but they are indeed good responses.

To its credit, *Democracy and Leadership* is written from a pragmatic perspective that stresses popular use over esoteric value. Plato and Dewey are

presented as philosophers useful to non-academics, and Weber's critical analysis of these philosophers is a demonstration of discernment skills in public philosophy. Plato's identification of key leadership virtues is relevant, while his elitism and authoritarianism are dismissed. We can learn from the sages of antiquity, but we do not have to engage in hero worship. Weber's work is appropriately eclectic, taking ideas from philosophers and non-philosophers, and taking only what he needs from all of them without doing them or the readers any injustice.

Dewey might be regarded as an anti-hero philosopher, and Weber supplements Platonic elitism with humble Deweyan democracy. One must consider, however, to what extent leadership should involve the democratic impulse to accommodate the common person, and to what extent it should involve the willingness to go against the common person. Socrates and Cornel West, along with philosophers like Søren Kierkegaard, saw themselves as being antithetical to the crowd. *Democracy and Leadership* is based on the idea that people want good leadership—Weber cites polls indicating such—but philosophy should not always give people what they want. Courage can be found more in being a leader by example, not a leader by consent. Weber appropriately notes that "Rosa Parks had no followers the day she famously experimented with leadership" (89). I would offer also that her actions were probably not the result of a conscious process of deliberation with others. Insofar as her refusal to give up her seat would have come out of a public meeting—as a motion proposed, seconded, discussed, and voted on—it would be more like a publicity stunt than justice embodied. Rather, the Rosa Parks story is truly heroic. It is about one individual's refusal, body and soul, to submit to what that individual believes is an unjust law. Weber does well in noting the courage in her actions, and is right to imply that this was an experiment. She did not know whether she was right, but was willing to take a risk. This is courageous, indeed, but we need to notice that it is not moderate. She is a leader, but not a prudent one. Prudence says to accept the injustice and wait for the tide of public opinion to change. Parks was a leader in the Socratic sense, not the Aristotelian sense. She was an instigator, not a moderator. There is a place for such a leader in Deweyan democracy, but it seems to be minimized.

Nothing in *Democracy and Leadership* contradicts the value of such leadership by example. However, leadership here is understood as being common more than exceptional. Weber notes that Plato was correct to propose the exceptional virtues required for guardianship, but erred in advocating elitist ideals of value and a totalitarian state of government. He adds to this Dewey's

more humble democratic method of inquiry as a model for leadership. Leaders are not born, they are made, and they are made within the context of democratic deliberation.

Writing a book about leadership is a step toward becoming a leader, but any speculation that the well-connected philosopher Weber will be running for prominent public office (and I am aware of none) is halted by noting the extent to which *Democracy and Leadership* is influenced by non-religious humanist Paul Kurtz. The common voter is suspicious of religious skeptics, even though Kurtz's views are not dangerous. Kurtz's pragmatism, Weber says, "rejects the modernist's idea of certainty," while it also "defends against the more extreme postmodern relativism, maintaining instead that knowledge is uncertain and revisable, yet effectual and progressively refinable" (115). Unfortunately, people tend to equate good leadership with certainty, as if what they want is a cult leader to love or hate. Changing views based on careful consideration is derided as flip-flopping. Among Weber's most promising topics considered is the "Mandate-Independence controversy," in which a politician could "represent the views of the majority of people who selected her for office, or she could think that the people who voted for her selected her values as the ones that should decide matters" (190). Weber, correctly in my estimation, inclines toward the independence side, saying that justice requires an independence from constituents to ensure "maximal consideration and respect for all relevant people" (191).

The philosophical platform of *Democracy and Leadership* is somewhere between epistemological certainty and Rorty. Dewey drew criticism for his 1934 book *A Common Faith*, which, on the one hand, was a philosophical accommodation of religious belief but, on the other hand, a religious accommodation of secularism. The legendary quip from George Santayana was that Dewey's book thus showed "a very common faith indeed." For philosophers accustomed to uncommon thoughts and radical thinkers, *Democracy and Leadership* might seem common in Santayana's sense. In fact, *pace* Weber, I do not find centrism and moderation to be especially important virtues. Yet for philosophers more accustomed to middle-ground, democratic Aristotelianism, Weber's book is useful and even inspiring, and the weight of common opinion should incline in favor of this work.

Tadd Ruetenik

St. Ambrose University